Talk about Talking about Constitutional Law by Samaha, Adam M.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers
2011
Talk about Talking about Constitutional Law
Adam M. Samaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that
a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adam Samaha, "Talk about Talking about Constitutional Law" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No.
368, 2011).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945432
CHICAGO  
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 368 
 
 
 
 
 
TALK ABOUT TALKING ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Adam M. Samaha 
 
 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 
 
October 2011 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series:  http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html 
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945432
Draft 2.5 1 October 18, 2011 
TALK ABOUT TALKING ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Adam M. Samaha* 
Constitutional theory branches into decision theory and discourse theory.  
The former concentrates on how constitutional decisions are or should be 
made, the latter on how constitutional issues are or should be discussed.  
For its part, originalism began as a method for resolving constitutional 
disagreement but it has migrated into discourse theory, as well.  Jack 
Balkin’s “living originalism” illustrates the move.  This essay examines 
inclusive versions of originalism like Balkin’s that permit many different 
answers to constitutional questions.  The essay then suggests pathologies 
associated with loose constitutional discourse in general.  For instance, a 
large domain for constitutional discourse can crowd out nonconstitutional 
argument and raise the stakes of disputes in ways that discourage 
compromise, creativity, and trust.  Under certain conditions, loose 
constitutional discourse is a distraction that cannot moderate societal 
divisions.  At its worst, loose constitutional discourse retards progress 
toward goals that it is supposed to achieve.  We still have much to learn 
about how constitutional discourse operates in fact and how it interacts with 
nonconstitutional argument.  At the moment, those inquiries probably are 
more important than more talk about how we ought to talk about 
constitutional law. 
Some people talk, some people decide.  Other people talk about deciding, 
and still other people talk about talking.  Of course talking and deciding are 
interrelated,1 but people tend to have a first love in these matters.  This is true 
in my line of work.  Although the title of “professor” designates us as talkers 
more than deciders (to the relief of countless citizens), there is plenty of 
diversity in what we discuss.  For example, much scholarly effort has been 
devoted to constitutional decisions, including empirical studies of judicial 
behavior, recommendations on interpretive method, and consideration of 
institutional choice and design.  Significant work also has been done on 
constitutional discourse, including studies of rhetoric in popular culture and in 
social movements, as well as proposals for conducting rational or otherwise 
constructive deliberation on constitutional questions. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.  This essay was drafted for a 
symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism (2011), hosted by the University of Illinois Law 
School on April 8 and 9, 2011.  I thank the symposium participants, and especially Jack Balkin, for 
their reactions to an earlier draft.  I also received helpful feedback from Barry Friedman and Lior 
Strahilevitz.  Mistakes are mine. 
1 Talking involves a kind of decision, talking can constitute a decision, talking can facilitate 
other decisions, decisions can facilitate talking, and some decisions are not much more than talk.  
Precisely separating the two phenomena is not easy.  I hope that undefined categories based on 
intuition are adequate. 
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To the extent that it remains one single thing, originalism now has a role 
in both decision theory and discourse theory.  The former role is more 
familiar.  We are accustomed to enthusiasts promoting originalism as a 
method of deciding constitutional questions, especially for judges.  It can be 
used by other decision-makers, to be sure, but sound constitutional decisions 
had been the focus of originalist thinking, regardless.  In contrast, some recent 
theoretical work on originalism departs from this tradition.  Some theorists do 
not present their ideas about originalism as comprehensive advice for making 
decisions in identifiable cases.  Instead they pursue originalism as a way to 
ascertain law’s meaning in an isolated sense and without necessarily 
recommending much of anything in terms of case results,2 or as a way to 
discuss constitutional values regardless of institutional location and without 
necessarily taking positions on today’s contested issues.  Theories of this kind 
are not well-designed to answer direct questions such as, “Is there a judicially 
enforceable federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage?” 
If developed further in this direction, originalism might self-destruct — 
or, putting the thought more cautiously, the new versions of originalism might 
confirm an old criticism.  A long-standing objection has been that, for one 
reason or another, the historical sources on which originalism relies cannot 
really dictate answers to interesting questions that people have about 
constitutional law in the United States today.3  A darker suspicion sometimes 
follows:  If one believes that originalism is plagued by indeterminacy, then 
one might conclude that people who use originalism to advocate particular 
constitutional positions are driven by the same kind of political commitments 
that they often claim to exclude from their analysis.  What could have been a 
simple concern about whether originalism generates answers can turn into a 
conviction that originalists are deluded, hypocritical, or deceptive. 
But this is no criticism of an originalism that has nothing to do with 
decisions.  The above complaints are based on an alleged disconnect between 
originalism and some pattern of results — the indeterminacy complaint 
alleges that that there can be no pattern; the deception complaint alleges that 
there is a pattern dictated by politics.  But if originalism, rightly understood, 
can only ascertain what “equal protection” means in a literary sense without 
telling judges what to do with that meaning, or if it can only facilitate a 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 
1823–24 (1997) (segregating the concept of interpretation from the practice of adjudication); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 27–30 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.  These theories of interpretation do not fit easily into the 
category of discourse theory, but neither do they fit easily into the category of decision theory.  
Some theories of interpretation have an abstract quality shared with some discourse theories, and 
this is the connection that I am making in the text. 
3 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. 
REV. 204, 218–22 (1980). 
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discussion about what “equal protection” should mean today, then many 
opponents of originalism can calm down.  There would be no superimposed 
pattern of results in specific controversies to fuel the deception charge.  And 
the now-conceded indeterminacy of originalism might even have beneficial 
consequences.  Originalism might become anyone’s tool.  Methodological 
détente might come into view.  Constitutional debate might become more 
civil and disagreement more manageable. 
Or perhaps the shift in focus will be a loss of focus, with divisions 
remaining equally wide and the task of decision equally urgent.  In this essay, 
I develop this skeptical attitude toward discourse theory and the new 
originalism.  I will not show that discourse theorizing is necessarily wasteful, 
but I will offer uncomfortably mixed views on recent talk about talking about 
constitutional law.4  My principal doubt involves whether a relatively loose 
constitutional discourse tends to increase the legitimacy of a political system.  
An inclusive discourse that allows for many possible answers to 
constitutional questions does sound friendly.  But talk can accomplish only so 
much, and constitutional talk can raise the stakes of disputes in a way that 
discourages rather than encourages compromise, creativity, and trust.  If a 
large domain for constitutional discourse crowds out nonconstitutional 
argument, participants in the political system may find themselves further 
divided, not united, by easy recourse to constitutional claims. 
I.  MORE CONSTITUTION TALK 
Converting policy positions into constitutional arguments is a remarkable 
practice in the United States.  “Constitutional” can mean several things but 
here I refer to supreme law, as in a trumping norm that cannot be beaten 
within the rules of legal argument.  Having supreme law on your side is the 
power to overcome all other claims sourced in law.  If people believe that 
they should abide by the law, it is also the power to make disagreement with 
you a source of shame or ethical crisis.  Acting against your position must 
take the form of extralegal resistance, which is only occasionally valorized 
and more often a sign of danger to ordinary people.  This helps explain why 
even the radical fringes of a society might engage in constitutional argument 
before invoking so-called higher law, let alone the virtues of law-breaking.  
Thus socialist Charles Schenck’s leaflet relied on the Thirteenth Amendment 
as a reason to resist military conscription during World War I,5 and the Black 
                                                 
4 Part of my discomfort stems from my decision to talk about talk about talking about 
constitutional law, but this is not the only source of my mixed feelings. 
5 “The Constitution of the United States is one of the greatest bulwarks of political liberty.  . . . 
.  A conscripted citizen is forced to surrender his right as a citizen and become a subject.  He is 
forced into involuntary servitude.  He is deprived of the protection given him by the Constitution of 
the United States.”  Transcript of Record at 4 (insert), Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
(No. 437). 
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Panther Party’s second platform relied on the Second Amendment as a reason 
for black people to arm themselves in the face of police brutality.6 
Because this practice is so long-standing, deployed in the service of so 
many ideologies, and used in so many argument settings, investigating 
constitutional discourse as a generalized whole might be worthwhile.7  
Interested scholars could carefully identify features of this practice that occur 
regardless of context but that distinguish it from nonconstitutional discourse.  
From there, we might better understand a significant part of our politics.  
Constitution talk probably does structure people’s thinking to some extent.  
Mapping this form of discourse should help reveal how political participants 
communicate with each other, how their opinions are influenced by 
constitutional debate, and when the influence of such talk runs out.  Various 
contributions have been made along these lines during the last thirty years 
and more.  The notion of a deliberative democracy once attracted excitement,8 
a participatory democratic model vied for attention,9 and the cool kids in 
constitutional theory moved outside the courtroom to study the external 
origins of acceptable constitutional arguments.10  To the extent that 
institution-specific analysis in legal theory11 underemphasizes such cross-
institution phenomena, discourse theory might be a welcome corrective. 
Jack Balkin’s recent writings are illustrative.  They draw from traditions 
in constitutional debate beyond the judiciary, and they recommend ground 
rules for the future.12  Balkin wants participants to fit their arguments with the 
text of the Constitution of the United States, plus general principles that can 
be associated with that document.  But otherwise, all bets are off.  Discarding 
                                                 
6 “We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-
defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression 
and brutality.  The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear 
arms.  We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self defense.”  BLACK 
PANTHER PARTY PLATFORM AND PROGRAM ¶ 7 (Oct. 1966). 
7 I do not mean that constitutional arguments are more common than other forms of argument 
in the United States; it seems clear to me that the opposite is true. 
8 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996). 
9 See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW 
AGE (1984). 
10 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2596, 2602 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). 
11 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and 
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003). 
12 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); see also JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011). 
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the jargon and shrinking an effusive argument into a few words, his 
recommendation is basically this:  Divide the document into rules and 
standards, follow the rules, and leave the standards vague.13  The Constitution 
means no less and no more, although it turns out that we all have a lot of 
“constitutional construction” to do after the document’s meaning runs out.  
Vague constitutional standards are Balkin’s special concern, and he 
emphasizes that we can be faithful to the original meaning of certain parts of 
the Constitution only by refusing to replace these standards with the specific 
expected applications of past generations.  What those generations expected 
to happen after enactment is not necessarily what the vague parts of the 
enacted text mean, for us or for them.14 
Importantly, however, the original meaning of the Constitution is not the 
outer boundary of constitutional argument.  True, Balkin contends that 
treating the Constitution as law requires fidelity to the document’s original 
semantic meaning, which is sometimes a vague standard instead of a specific 
lesson.  In those situations, claiming that the Constitution means something 
specific would be disregarding the document, not following it.  But Balkin 
also knows that abstract standards will not provide clear answers to many 
contemporary disputes, and he wants constitutional discourse to deliver at 
least some of these answers.  This is where “constitutional construction” 
comes into play.15 
What is constitutional construction, exactly?  Theorists sympathetic to the 
idea are still toying with various specifications, and there is no consensus on 
which institutions ought to be engaged in the practice.16  For Balkin, 
                                                 
13 He also stresses “principles” but the difference between standards and principles is not 
terribly dramatic.  Balkin’s principles are values that must be considered but that are vague in their 
boundaries and in how they apply to particular circumstances.  See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, 
supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 314–17 n. 12) (discussing rules, standards, and principles). 
14 See, e.g., id. at __ (manuscript at 105–08).  Balkin’s distinction between original meaning 
and original expected application is not new.  Ronald Dworkin trumpeted roughly the same divide 
in the 1980s, distinguishing concepts from conceptions.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 71–
72 (1986) (relating the distinction to levels of abstraction and the exposure of disagreement); see 
also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 120–23 (2006) (distinguishing abstract moral principles 
that he finds in certain constitutional provisions from the expected applications of those 
provisions).  The level-of-generality issue has been around for a long time, too.  See, e.g., Laurence 
H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1057, 1061–63 (1990) (covering both enumerated and unenumerated rights); Paul Brest, The 
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091–92 (1981) (“[A]ll adjudication requires making choices 
among the levels of generality on which to articulate principles . . . .”). 
15 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 103) (distinguishing 
“interpretation-as-construction” from “interpretation-as-ascertainment”). 
16 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 118–23 (2004) (characterizing constitutional construction as principled gap filling to 
resolve cases after interpretation runs out, and indicating substantial judicial involvement); Keith E. 
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construction is composed of today’s conventional modes of constitutional 
argument and the results reached thereunder, minus the Constitution’s 
original semantic meaning.  Thus the entire range of arguments that lawyers, 
judges, and various advocates now use to make constitutional claims would 
remain available under his model.  You could still rely on Supreme Court 
precedent; I could still rely on drafting history; we both could attempt to 
change the culture, the politicians, and the judges who decide constitutional 
questions.  It is just that many of those efforts would be categorized as 
attempts merely to implement the Constitution’s original meaning at a given 
point in time, instead of establishing the Constitution’s original meaning for 
all time.  So, absent formal amendment, the original meaning of the 
Constitution would remain stable — but the contemporary construction of 
grand phrases such as “equal protection of the laws” and grand concepts such 
as “separation of powers” could be contested during each generation and, at 
some point, repudiated.  In this way, Balkin synthesizes one version of 
originalism with one version of living constitutionalism.17 
Although mixing sources for constitutional argument is commonplace, 
not everyone practices constitutional debate in Balkin’s way and so his effort 
has a live normative element.  Some originalists might prefer to specify the 
meaning of vague clauses in accord with concrete historical examples, or at 
least follow the level of generality suggested by that history.  Balkin opposes 
these positions.  Some nonoriginalists might prefer to treat judicial precedent 
on par with any other source of supreme law, or at least give these decisions a 
strong presumption of correctness.  Balkin opposes these positions, too.  He 
wants to leave major constitutional questions underdetermined by 
constitutional meaning as a strategy for increasing the legitimacy of the 
system.18  Supposedly, people will debate and disagree over constitutional 
                                                 
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–29 
(2010) (placing constitutional construction on a continuum between interpretation and change, and 
emphasizing nonjudicial action); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–08 (2010) (discussing interpretation as the process of ascertaining 
linguistic meaning and construction as involving the legal effect of legal texts, without plainly 
preferring judicial over nonjudicial involvement in the latter); cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (concentrating on judicial doctrine as a mechanism for 
implementing constitutional norms).  A critique of the emerging interpretation/construction 
distinction that separates original semantic meaning from legal meaning is Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts on the Carving of 
Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010).  For a pragmatic view that integrates the 
meaning of a constitutional provision with its implementation, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 173, 175 (2006). 
17 Accord Solum, supra note 16, at 117 (observing that living constitutionalism might live 
within “the construction zone” that is demarcated by original semantic meaning). 
18 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 402–20) (relying on 
several versions of legitimacy). 
Draft 2.5 7 October 18, 2011 
norms without permanently splitting into camps of Red and Blue, camps that 
aim to establish sole proprietary rights to the Real Constitution.  If we use the 
Constitution as a common language or source of authority that is not too 
restrictive, the argument runs, we might bridge several societal divisions:  
cultural divisions over values, status divisions between commoners and legal 
professionals, and intergenerational divisions between our judgment and 
ancient judgments.  Each generation will fight over fundamental questions, 
but all sides may point to the Constitution at any time, and the losing side 
might have “faith” that the prevailing regime will be “redeemed” in due time. 
II.  TALK SKEPTICISM 
A legitimating constitutional discourse might be a friendly compromise 
for a political community that should be held together, but proposals to 
achieve it arrive with complications.  These complications arise even if we 
forget about the particular institutions in which constitutional decisions are 
made, and instead ponder how constitutional discourse might be formulated 
in more abstract terms.  I raise three problems here.  The first two involve 
pathologies that can arise from relatively loose versions of constitutional 
discourse, while the third applies to a conservative version of constitutional 
discourse that Balkin seems to endorse.19 
A.  The Domain Problem 
Constitutional debate is not the only game in town.  It might seem more 
significant, or more interesting, or more thrilling than other types of debate.  
                                                 
19 I put aside three other problems related to the health of our politics. 
First, one might think that the character of constitutional discourse will influence how 
constitutional text is drafted going forward and that this influence should be defended.  I will 
assume that new text via Article V or constitutional convention is not likely to happen with 
sufficient frequency to make ex ante drafting incentives important (an assumption that seems safe 
under loose versions of constitutional discourse, anyway). 
Second and more significant, the character of constitutional discourse can have an effect on 
the formal amendment rate and, once again, one might fairly demand that any such effect be 
defended.  A convincing defense would require a thorough comparison of Article V with other 
lawmaking procedures, which is not obviously the kind of analysis that excites discourse theorists.  
Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, in THE 
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229 
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds. 2006) (comparing judicial updating to formal 
amendment). 
Third, one might think that most of the debatable constitutional questions are not very 
important to society’s well-being.  Balkin’s version of constitutional discourse might well leave the 
most important features of the constitutional order untouched, such as the specific rules regarding 
the composition of Congress, while directing excessive attention to a few vague clauses and 
principles.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).  I will charitably 
assume that enforcement decisions regarding vague standards in the U.S. Constitution are socially 
significant, or that debate over those standards can have legitimating effects regardless of the social 
consequences following their enforcement. 
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Sometimes it is.  But people constantly communicate with each other in 
nonconstitutional registers, even when debating issues that are intensely 
important to them.  Constitutional argument is, in fact, an outlier practice for 
normal human beings.  Even for law professors, actually.  We direct large 
amounts of analytic effort to policy questions without consciously or 
subconsciously developing constitutional positions.  Whether inside or 
outside the academy, then, you can discuss the appropriate amount of carbon 
dioxide emissions as a personal ethical matter without making a broader 
moral claim; you can make a moral claim about human emissions without 
making a legal claim; you can make a legal claim about those emissions 
without making a constitutional claim; and, if you like the dichotomy 
between interpretation and construction, you can make a claim about how the 
Constitution should be constructed today to deal with emissions without 
making a claim about what the Constitution means forevermore.20 
A major challenge for normative discourse theorists is identifying the 
correct domain for constitutional argument in relation to nonconstitutional 
argument.  These two types of discourse should be considered together 
because, although they are distinguishable practices, the rules for one are 
likely to affect the shape of the other.  The challenge is probably more 
complicated if we have to make an interpretation/construction dichotomy.  In 
that case, discourse theorists must defend some particular mix of (1) 
argument over constitutional meaning, (2) argument over constitutional 
construction, and (3) argument over nonconstitutional policy.  Can discourse 
theorists persuasively show which proportions of argument types are best?  
Can they explain the interrelationships between these types?  Have they tried?  
As far as I know, the answer to these questions is “no.” 
Constitutional discourse does seem meaningfully different from other 
kinds of discourse, at least insofar as a constitutional argument involves resort 
to norms that are confined to law but that have no superior within law.  That 
said, figuring out how much constitutional argument is ideal for a political 
community of any significant scale is an extraordinarily difficult task.  Even 
the more modest question whether we ought to have a bit more or a bit less 
constitutional argument is tricky.  Large difficulties would persist even if we 
all agreed on the goal for setting the domain, such as maximizing legitimacy 
specified in some way.  Overcoming these difficulties demands a reliable 
model of human psychology and behavior.  The model must be sophisticated 
                                                 
20 I do not want to claim that these categories are easy to delineate or that they do not overlap, 
whether in terms of how people think about their arguments or how they express them.  In private 
correspondence with me, Barry Friedman was right to warn about the difficulties involved in 
identifying different types of normative argument, at least as a functional matter.  Nevertheless, the 
content of these arguments do differ, as I indicate below.  They are meaningfully distinct genres, 
and they tend to be treated that way by discourse theorists. 
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enough to compare the effects of differing amounts and even types of 
constitutional claims on achieving the given goal.  My sense is that no one 
has presented much more than speculation on these matters.21 
At the same time, different versions of proper constitutional discourse 
will have different effects on the overall amount of constitutional argument.  
Take Balkin’s version, which strives to leave open many fundamental 
questions for constitutional construction.  He sees value in avoiding too much 
constitutional settlement.  A predictable consequence, however, would be 
more constitutional debate than many other alternative versions of 
constitutional discourse.  Balkin attempts to defend a spacious zone for 
constitutional construction in relation to constitutional meaning, but he does 
not offer any thoughts about the domain of constitutional argument in relation 
to nonconstitutional argument.  He is working on one margin but his position 
implicates more than one.  In fact, at least three dimensions of discourse are 
in play.  By adopting the interpretation/construction distinction, theorists such 
as Balkin beg inquiry into the interactions among two forms of constitutional 
argument as well as nonconstitutional argument (which itself is separable into 
thinner slices).  Claims regarding constitutional construction might gobble up 
any number of significant policy disagreements no matter how small we make 
the space for constitutional meaning.  The looser the discourse on 
constitutional construction becomes, the larger the resulting domain relative 
to nonconstitutional discourse, all else equal.  Is that a desirable direction in 
which to move?  Is it better than leaving everything that Balkin calls 
constitutional construction to so-called ordinary politics?  How can we tell? 
Suppose the goal is widespread acceptance of the political and legal 
order.  Perhaps this is not the highest end for human institutions, but it is an 
understandable concern of constitutional theory.22  I would not quickly 
concede that discourse or debate necessarily promotes acceptance rather than 
hardening positions and increasing alienation.  Under some circumstances 
and at some point, silence or separation helps settle things.  But suppose 
                                                 
21 No doubt there is a floor on the domain of constitutional argument; someone will cast a 
claim in constitutional terms so long as the category exists and so long as compliance with law 
retains respectability.  But recognizing the hardiness of constitutional assertions does little or 
nothing to justify some particular size or shape for the domain of such claims. 
22 To be clear, simple psychological acceptance and sociological legitimacy are not Balkin’s 
only concern.  See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 408–09) 
(distinguishing sociological, legal, and moral legitimacy).  But those are relevant issues for him, 
see, e.g., id.; id. at __ (manuscript at 1360) (“Constitutional constructions become durable when 
people stop fighting about them and accept them in practice.”), and many others, see, e.g., Richard 
H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795–96 (2005); id. at 
1805 (“The Constitution is law not because it was lawfully ratified, as it may not have been, but 
because it is accepted as authoritative.”); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 625 (2008). 
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otherwise.  Suppose that human beings invariably respect each other more 
and accept defeat more gracefully after a good long talk.  This conclusion 
would stretch the evidence on sociological and psychological legitimacy,23 
but let us be generous.  We still must know the effect of constitutional talk 
before we can begin to evaluate various models for constitutional discourse. 
 
We should ask whether the temperature of social conflict goes up or down 
when arguments are easy rather than difficult to convert into constitutional 
terms.  One hypothesis is that more people will more easily buy into the 
system if they all have easy access to constitutional claims, which they may 
hope will prevail within a generation or two.24  But there is no reason to leave 
that suggestion untested.  A plausible competing hypothesis is that few people 
truly care much about events that will occur generations after their death, let 
alone merely possible events.  Although people regularly talk about their care 
for future generations (“our children’s children” and all that), it is difficult to 
find reliable evidence of personal sacrifice that is best explained by the desire 
to benefit the future.25  For the political left, an illustration might be 
                                                 
23 Cf. David L. Markell, Tom Tyler & Sarah F. Brosnan, What has Love Got to Do with It?: 
Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making 5–6, 15–23 (Sept. 7, 2011) (concluding from 
a web-based survey of a non-random sample of “elites” (n = 228) interested in land-use disputes 
that, (1) for protecting monetary values, positive responses were associated with the perceived 
neutrality of the judge, and (2) for protecting sentimental values, positive responses were associated 
with trust in the judge, which partly turned on opportunities for voice and signs of respect), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923807.  The survey also indicated that court judgments 
garnered the highest overall level of acceptance among five dispute-resolution procedures tested, 
but that courts placed third behind referenda and negotiation in protecting sentimental value.  See 
id. at 18. 
24 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 402–20). 
25 Among the empirical contributions on this topic, consider, for instance, Arthur C. Brooks, 
Do People Really Care About the Arts for Future Generations?, 28 J. CULTURAL ECON. 275, 283 
(2004) (unable to reject the hypothesis that people are “purely intergenerationally egoistic” in their 
support for public art); Arthur C. Brooks, Public Goods and Posterity: An Empirical Test of 
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convenient doubts about climate change that developed once economic 
recession made immediate sacrifice for long-term gain more burdensome.  
For the political right, an illustration might be the convenient belief that 
Keynesian stimulus programs were necessary to prevent recession from 
turning into depression, whatever the cost in future debt burdens. 
Yet another competing hypothesis would be equally devastating.  Perhaps 
constitutionalizing arguments makes the stakes of a given dispute appear 
higher than otherwise.26  And perhaps the perception of high stakes drives 
down the probability of compromise and trust.  Although relevant empirical 
and experimental evidence is hardly consistent or conclusive, there is plenty 
of reason to believe that high-stakes questions often prompt people to fight 
harder and take fewer risks on innovative proposals for reconciliation.27  One 
can hope that people concentrate on the public good when the problems they 
face escalate in importance, and this no doubt happens under certain 
conditions, but discourse theories ought to rest on more than optimism.  The 
easy conversion of policy positions into constitutional claims might make the 
urge to prevail over others ever stronger.  Supreme law would be at stake, 
after all.  If all of this is true, any causal link between loose constitutional 
discourse and a cohesive political community would disappear.  The 
polarizing effects could easily outrun the cohesive effects. 
True, in its most extreme version, loose constitutional discourse probably 
would not increase the stakes of argument.  Indeed the loosest imaginable 
constitutional discourse could eliminate the stakes entirely by eroding any 
difference with ordinary political argument.  If every policy position could 
                                                 
Intergenerational Altruism, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. 165, 173–74 (2003) (testing whether reported 
charitable giving to social services, education, religion, and politics have an intergenerationally 
altruistic component and answering “yes,” but only narrowly and only for the last two); David 
Popp, Altruism and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 77 L. ECON. 339, 348 (2001) (finding 
some evidence that people value environmental amenities both for themselves and for future 
generations). 
26 Contrast prospective gains and losses, however.  See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 344 (1984) (finding that people 
are risk-seeking when facing losses and risk-averse when facing gains); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118–19 (1996) (similar); 
Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 167 
(2000) (stating that the reverse is true for low probability losses and gains). 
27 See, e.g., Olof Johansson-Stenman, Minhaj Mahmud & Peter Martinsson, Does Stake Size 
Matter in Trust Games?, 88 ECON. LETTERS 365, 367–68 & tbls. 1 & 2 (2005); Charles A. Holt & 
Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1647, 1653–54 
(2002); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 4–5, 17 (1984); see generally Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 322–26 (2010) (reviewing theory and research on low-
stakes versus high-stakes decision making); cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE at x (1991) (decrying the “exaggerated absoluteness, . . 
. hyperindividualism, . . . [and] insularity” of rights talk in the United States). 
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easily be recast as a viable constitutional argument at any point in time, it is 
unclear what would be gained from the label.  An argument could not aspire 
to greater durability on account of its constitutional status, for instance; no 
one could win a constitutional argument for any measurable length of time.  
Characterizing your argument as constitutional might only signal strong 
feelings, or do nothing at all.  However, neither Balkin nor others working on 
discourse theory seems to water down the significance of winning a 
constitutional argument that much.  Balkin’s suggestion appears to be that 
prevailing constitutional constructions should be less difficult to change than 
the Constitution’s original meaning yet more difficult to change than 
nonconstitutional policy.  This difference between construction and policy is 
not immediately apparent in Balkin’s book; his subject is constitutional 
discourse, not nonconstitutional discourse.  But this is the problem. 
Finally, relatively loose standards for constitutional discourse might have 
other alienating and aggravating effects.  Surely some advocates will use 
constitutional arguments strategically, knowing that some others will take 
their points more seriously in that form.  As well, in attempting to prevent 
undesirable outcomes entailed by the constitutional arguments of others, 
objections that would have been cast in ordinary policy terms will more likely 
be translated into the language of constitutional law.  Strategic and defensive 
uses of constitutional dialogue are not without social benefit; they generate 
useful information, for instance.   Nonetheless, they seem to include a kind of 
cost to which discourse theorists should be sensitive.  These practices involve 
opportunism and the embrace of arguments that do not reflect the honest 
feelings of their proponents.  In a significant sense, they are inauthentic.  It is 
worth wondering whether a loose constitutional discourse that is inflated by 
strategic uses can produce a more cohesive political community, to say 
nothing of a community whose cohesion is morally justified.28  Ordinarily, 
language is not the kind of common resource that can be overused.  But the 
kind of language envisioned by constitutional discourse theorists might well 
be too attractive for the social good. 
Nationalists and patriots, if no others, might be tempted to cite the United 
States as evidence that loose constitutional discourse works.  This country has 
not split apart despite significant diversity and fundamental disagreement — 
not for more than a century, anyway.  The Constitution is indeed a unifying 
icon, despite or because its details are not widely known.29  In addition, 
                                                 
28 I have in mind a connection to John Rawls’s idea of public reason derived from an 
overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, see JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 132–40 
(1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 136–37 (1996), which might not, in fact, be adequate 
to the task of achieving sociological legitimacy in a diverse society insofar as people feel alienated 
from the public reasons available to them. 
29 See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 3 (1986) (“[F]or almost two 
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theorists such as Balkin are not asking for constitutional debate to change in a 
radical way.  And, compared to some originalists, Balkin might be allotting 
far more territory to constitutional construction than to the even higher stakes 
domain of constitutional meaning.  On the other hand, only those who are 
satisfied with today’s levels of political friction and polarization will take the 
United States as a success story on legitimacy.  Cautionary tale might be the 
more fitting description.  An unresolved question, moreover, is how best to 
maximize particular values such as political legitimacy with the least social 
dysfunction possible.  Normative discourse theorists who accept the status 
quo are not demonstrating that we cannot do better.  To do that, they will 
have to show that the character of constitutional debate cannot be changed by 
design, that such change would be too costly, or that change is unneeded 
because we happen to have the optimal mix of constitutional and 
nonconstitutional debate.  Good work remains undone on each point. 
B.  The Variance Problem 
A second problem has the same source as the domain problem.  A loose 
constitutional discourse will not only attract a large number of policy 
arguments, it will encompass many conflicting viewpoints as well.  Indeed, a 
socially important mission for normative discourse theory is building forums 
in which people with different views may understand and peacefully converse 
with each other.  Therefore, the common “language” must be quite thin.  It 
must not commit any of the (desired) participants to any of the contested 
positions that they happen to hold.  As the variance in opinion that must be 
accommodated becomes higher, the rules of discourse must become thinner.  
To the extant that an inclusive model of constitutional discourse is advocated 
as a constructive response to ideological diversity, the model cannot be very 
confining in terms of acceptable constitutional positions. 
At the same time, there will be losers.  Many of them.  Decisions will be 
made that privilege one constitutional position over another, at least in the 
short run.  Hence the decision to forgo health insurance will be sheltered from 
legislative prohibition, or instead subject to legislative policy choices, or even 
abolished to support a constitutional right to health care.  The decision to 
terminate a pregnancy will be sheltered from legislative prohibition, or 
instead subject to legislative policy choices, or even criminalized as a matter 
of constitutional law to avoid underinclusive murder statutes.  These are only 
some conceivable constitutional positions that would be accommodated 
within a loose discourse.  They cannot all prevail at the same time.  Someone 
will lose (even if discourse theorists do not specify how the constitutional 
                                                 
centuries, [the Constitution] has been swathed in . . . a fulsome rhetoric of reverence more than 
offset by the reality of ignorance.”); Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 
1290, 1294, 1298 (1937) (noting the role of symbol in fostering order). 
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decision will be made). 
Now we have a hitch in the peacemaking function of loose constitutional 
discourse.  None of the losers can be convinced that they ought to accept their 
losses just because they accept the Constitution.  Constitutional law, however 
supreme, would have no such persuasive force.  The open dialogue was 
designed to avoid precisely this power.  To be sure, there are reasons to doubt 
that many people stop fighting for their positions when other people tell them 
that the Constitution is against them.  I am sympathetic to those doubts.  But 
any such pacifying effect seems to be sacrificed by loose constitutional 
dialogue.  We are left to wonder what legitimating value losers will assign to 
the message not that they were wrong about the true meaning of the 
Constitution, but rather that participants in the debate all began with the same 
indeterminate resources for legal argument.  What difference can that make?  
Will it make acquiescence more likely or more justified because the result 
was not predetermined or not predictable? 
Lotteries sometimes garner support on these grounds,30 but law covers 
both more and less of the territory in which randomized social decisions are 
defensible.  Although it might be a calming sign of respect when political 
opponents use the same constitutional language, this is not always true.  
Boxers mimic handshakes at the beginning of their bouts without eliminating 
an ensuing brutality.  Even if we think that tagging shared cultural elements 
has a unifying effect, it is not obvious why the effect would be greater or 
different than saluting the flag or tipping hats before the debate begins.  
Perhaps constitutional lingo is a fairly elaborate way of sending those signals, 
which could be jettisoned for purposes of simplification.  Personally, I am not 
confident of this view but neither can I find obvious evidence on the other 
side.  Serious discourse theorists should grapple harder with the mechanisms 
of legitimacy before concluding that the ability to formulate a vast spectrum 
of arguments in originalist terms will make any difference.31 
Pointing to roughly equal chances in the short run is not the only way to 
promote a loose constitutional discourse, however.  Another way to win the 
allegiance of today’s losers is by emphasizing the long run.32  Consider one of 
the asserted benefits of a large domain for constitutional construction:  
Provisional settlements that merely implement the original meaning of the 
                                                 
30 See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 18–21 
(2009) (setting out justifications for randomization, including equal claims to an indivisible good). 
31 This variance problem becomes worse as the domain of constitutional argument becomes 
larger, but the problem exists as long as the domain has a significant reach. 
32 Both Balkin and Mike Seidman suggest this possibility.  The latter developed his argument 
ten years ago in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION:  A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 55 (2001). 
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Constitution are supposed to be vulnerable over time.  Once participants in 
constitutional debate understand that any constitutional construction can be 
reformed with sustained argument and political mobilization, that only a 
partial framework for politics and government is even arguably fixed, then 
losers might have hope of turning the tables.  For similar reasons, winners 
might be more restrained within a system of loose constitutional dialogue.  
They cannot be sure of lasting victory.  They might have to prepare for life on 
the outskirts of political power. 
If this sounds like rotation in office under conditions of electoral 
competition, it should.33  Essentially the same arguments can be made that 
competitive elections with organized political parties can increase 
sociological legitimacy to sustainable levels.  The resemblance ought to 
prompt us to ask again about the added value of loose constitutional 
discourse, especially insofar as it holds out the promise of change through the 
channels of politics.  Constitutional constructions are, at least in part, the 
products of popular opinion, social movements, and interest groups acting 
with and through officeholders, policy agendas, and program design.  One of 
the contributions of constitutional discourse theory is a reminder that ordinary 
politics and constitutional law are inseparable practices.  The more these two 
practices are connected, however, the less special legitimizing force loose 
constitutional discourse can possibly have. 
Elections, however, take place in much shorter increments.  
Constitutional dialogue is ordinarily not modeled to have any such immediate 
effect, as I indicated above.  Recognizing that change in constitutional 
constructions generally takes much longer and much more effort than change 
in ordinary policy opens up challenging questions about the relationship 
between the pace of legal change and the level of system legitimacy.  Is it 
more soothing to think that your loss is reversible in the next election cycle, 
or in the next generation?  If the response is that constitutional victories are 
supposed to be more entrenched than other political victories, and so 
constitutional losers rightly can be asked to wait, then I think the losers’ reply 
will be that a loose constitutional dialogue minimizes the difference between 
constitutional and ordinary political victories.  A dialogue loose enough to 
encompass the positions of a diverse political community implies that many if 
not all significant political victories can be recharacterized as constitutional 
commitments — and vice versa.  One side’s constitutional victory will be 
                                                 
33 See generally Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1835 (2009).  On the possibly 
constructive role of courts in maintaining these systems, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff, 
Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961 (2011), and Matthew C. 
Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial 
Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003). 
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another side’s ordinary political victory, and possibly an illegitimate one at 
that.  And so we might hope that people keep singing the national anthem or 
start sporting flag pins to show membership in the same political community, 
and avoid the trouble of translating their arguments into a constitutional 
language that risks encompassing too much and accomplishing too little. 
C.  The Conservatism Problem 
Certain versions of constitutional dialogue are not nearly as inclusive as 
the above concerns suggest.  The acceptable outcomes from constitutional 
dialogue can be limited to what seems normal, or mainstream, or 
nondisruptive.  If what started as a big tent gets smaller, there is the 
possibility for greater guidance on particular constitutional questions.  This 
might be counted as a gain.  But any advantage from clarity comes with the 
disadvantage, once again, of losing the losers’ allegiance to the system.  This 
risk is quite difficult to eliminate.  It will arise from those who object to the 
narrowed set of acceptable outcomes and also from those who more generally 
oppose a conservative version of constitutional dialogue.  While loosening the 
dialogue might garner more signatories, making the dialogue more outcome-
determinative will multiply its opponents.34 
Balkin’s work, in the end, exemplifies this more conservative option.  
Each application of his text-plus-principle approach — to the privileges or 
immunities clause, to the equal protection clause, to the commerce clause — 
is a defense of some part of the status quo.35  If you felt uneasy about the 
ability of conventional constitutional analysis to unleash the federal 
government against the Great Depression and Jim Crow, and also to condemn 
school segregation and abortion regulation, text-plus-principle is supposed to 
place those outcomes in respectable legal standing.  If instead you were 
comfortable with any of the opposite outcomes, Balkin’s analysis can only 
make you feel uncomfortable (or unmoved).  His conclusions are not 
presented as reasonable possibilities.  They are the product of extensive 
argument designed to convince the reader of one particular conclusion after 
another, so long as the reader takes this form of constitutional discourse as 
given. 
But I doubt that anyone will, and Balkin is not asking for that sort of 
charity.  His argument for his form of constitutional discourse rests on its 
ability to bring people into the fold.  The argument is supposed to be a 
                                                 
34 This section might suggest that legitimacy-seeking discourse theorists have been unfairly 
placed in a dilemma, whereby constitutional dialogue is always either too loose or too restrictive.  I 
accept that there might be a way to thread the needle, but I also believe it is worth presenting both 
sorts of concerns, along with the general question regarding the value of constitutional discourse 
compared to other forms of debate. 
35 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript chs. 9–11). 
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response to the risk that people will further divide, polarize, and smash into or 
spin away from each other.  Today, however, there is no consensus that 
expansion of the regulatory and welfare state represented by the New Deal 
and the Great Society is constitutionally permissible.  If the goal is to 
convince people that text-plus-principle dialogue is able to produce mutually 
exclusive constitutional outcomes, one would like to see the method used to 
produce unorthodox results.  If the method is not capable of achieving this — 
if it cannot be used to generate conflicting answers to significant 
constitutional questions but instead only offers the possibility of serious 
change over generations — then adherence becomes far more costly to 
millions of people making choices now. 
In application as opposed to theory, Balkin’s text-plus-principle might not 
be well-designed for generating serious indeterminacy and perhaps better 
suited to validating the status quo against reform campaigns with short time 
horizons.  In that case, this roughly defined model for loose talk about the 
Constitution which seemed so ideologically inclusive will function as a 
conservative demand that advocates of change slow down.  The restraints on 
constitutional discourse which seemed so modest will become quite serious.  
And the implications for today’s constitutional decisions will become quite 
clear.  Even if the Constitution’s original meaning remains radically loose, 
constitutional construction can take back almost all of the slack.  That new 
constitutional constructions are easier to achieve than success in the nearly 
dormant Article V amendment process will be little comfort to those 
Americans who believe that the existing system has abandoned the Real 
Constitution.  To them, constitutional construction probably seems like the 
problem, not the solution. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of the foregoing has been critical.  I would like to close on a note of 
humility.  Dealing with fundamental disagreement is not easy.  It is almost 
certainly a problem that must be managed rather than solved.  The difficulties 
are so deep that many ideas on the matter are better than few, and therefore 
we can welcome the efforts of Balkin and other discourse theorists.  At the 
same time, they are only part of a larger intellectual community interested in 
when and why people accept decisions with which they disagree.  Prominent 
scholarship on legitimacy has yet to deliver a comprehensive answer on the 
particular conditions for acceptance.36  Specialists in human behavior are 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4–7, 161–63 (2006 ed.); Tom R. 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. OF PSYCH. 375 
(2006) (summarizing research and emphasizing procedural justice); James R. Kluegel & David S. 
Mason, Fairness Matters: Social Justice and Political Legitimacy in Post-Communist Europe, 56 
EUR.-ASIA STUDIES 813, 826 (2004) (“[T]here is a close connection between economic success and 
political support in these countries [based on prior studies] . . . .  But it is clear from the results here 
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probably only beginning to understand exactly how people conduct 
productive discussions that reconcile more than they aggravate, along with 
the circumstances under which people will agree to acquiesce despite 
opposition from the loudest voices of conscience.  Something similar can be 
said about those who study the dynamic interaction of constitutional and 
nonconstitutional politics, and of legal and nonlegal institutions.  Whatever 
the most persuasive answers to the issues surrounding fundamental societal 
disagreement, discourse theorists in general and constitutional discourse 
theorists in particular are unlikely to produce those answers on their own.  
Most likely, they will have to talk to others who are talking in a different 
language. 
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